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The relationship between Turkey and the European Union2 has had its ups and 
downs since 1963. Although Turkey and EU member states have always had 
their differences, a lid was kept on them during most of the Cold War thereby 
allowing for closer relations under the NATO umbrella. Following the dissipation 
of the ‘Soviet threat’, the dismantlement of the Warsaw Pact and the dissolution 
of the Soviet Union, these differences re-surfaced. Indeed, in the aftermath of the 
Cold War, EU politicians began referring to Turkey having become a ‘burden’ 
for building security in ‘Europe’. Such words came as a shock to Turkish policy-
makers and analysts alike who, since Turkey’s NATO membership in 1952, had 
come to think of the ‘security relationship’ as the strongest of ties that bound 
Turkey to Europe (and the United States). Against such background, EU policy-
makers’ post-1989 representations of Turkey as a source of ‘insecurity’, when 
coupled with the EU’s post-1980 coup criticisms of Turkey’s democratisation and 
human rights record, led some to conclude that EU policy-makers were oblivious 
to (if not negligent of) Turkey’s ‘legitimate’ security concerns.
These debates have taken a different turn since 1999 owing to changes in both 
Turkey and the European Union. On the EU side, there has emerged a relatively 
stronger resolve to have a military dimension to policy-making. In 1999 the 
European Union decided to develop a capacity for autonomous action backed 
up by credible military force. Accordingly, some EU policy-makers came to 
see Turkey in the way NATO does – a strategic asset by virtue of its military 
strength and geographical location. On Turkey’s side, critical changes followed 
the European Union’s 1999 decision to grant Turkey candidate country status. 
In the run-up to and aftermath of this decision, Turkey’s Europeanisation gained 
pace. The 2001 economic crisis created an opening not only for the financial and 
economic reforms demanded by the International Monetary Fund but also for 
the political reforms demanded by the EU. During this period, Turkey amended 
its constitution several times to improve the human rights situation, strengthen 
the rule of law, and restructure democratic institutions. Although problems with 
implementation remain, the prevailing view is that Turkey has come a long way 
toward meeting EU standards.
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In tandem with these changes on both sides of the relationship, the tone of the 
debates on Turkey and the European Union took a different turn. Both sides have 
the need for closer relations – some called for full membership, others a special 
relationship. The scholarly literature has invariably viewed this change of tone 
in debates as indicative of a closing of the gap between the security concerns of 
Turkey and the European Union due to either an increasing emphasis on military 
security on the EU’s part, or de-emphasis on military security on Turkey’s part, 
or both.3
Contrary to those who see a closing of the gap between Turkey and the European 
Union’s ways of ‘thinking about and doing security’, the present chapter argues 
that differences between Turkey and the European Union remain; EU policy-
makers continue to be concerned about Turkey as a source of ‘insecurity’ whereas 
Turkey’s policy-makers are wary of the potential repercussions of meeting the 
EU’s demands. These differences, I argue, are rooted in the respective security 
cultures of Turkey and the European Union. The two have grown apart from 
each other throughout the Cold War due to different ways of organising political 
community and identifying/addressing threats stemming from inside and outside 
this community. Not only have the two grown apart but also they have remained 
rather oblivious to each other’s security concerns. So much so that in the wake 
of the Cold War there surfaced a clash of security cultures between the two – a 
clash that manifested itself as debates on Turkey’s role in the evolving European 
security architecture during the 1990s and present-day battles on human rights, 
values and democracy.4
I use the term ‘security culture’ rather loosely, in reference to prevailing ways 
of thinking about and doing security in any given environment. As such, different 
cultures of security may exist and contend with each other at any given time. 
What I take to be the prevailing security culture is the one that is deduced from the 
discourses and other deeds of practitioners and other policy elite. Rather than taking 
for granted pre-existing entities and analysing the ‘threats’ faced by them, I follow 
the critical constructivist literature and focus on ‘representations of danger’5 by 
myriad actors.6 This approach is in contrast to mainstream approaches to security 
that assume the subject(s) of security to be pre-given and fixed, and that define 
security as ‘securing those fixed entities against objective and external threats’.7 
It is also in contrast to culturalist approaches to security that imagine a pre-given 
culture determining notions and policies of security.8 The critical constructivist 
perspective offered by Weldes et al. points to the mutually constitutive way in 
which the state (or any other community) is produced in an attempt to secure its 
identity and interests. They write:
in contrast to the received view, which treats the object of insecurity and 
insecurities themselves as pre-given or natural, and as ontologically separate 
things, we treat them as mutually constituted cultural and social constructions: 
insecurity itself is the product of processes of identity construction in which 
the self and the other, are constituted.9
Security dimension 69
Weldes et al.’s critical constructivist approach, thus, makes a significant 
contribution by focusing on the mutually constitutive relationship between 
identity, interests and insecurity and the (re)production of ‘cultures of insecurity’. 
In what follows, the chapter traces the divergent evolution of the European Union’s 
and Turkey’s security cultures and points to the persistence of these differences 
thus far.
Highlighting the differences in security cultures as a source of the difficulties 
in EU–Turkey relations does not entail taking ‘culture’ as given, fixed or 
unchanging. Rather, following critical constructivist theorising in International 
Relations,10 the argument here stresses the malleability of security culture and the 
mutually constitutive relationship between security and culture. As Weldes et al. 
have argued, ‘insecurities, rather than being natural facts, are social and cultural 
productions’.11 Security cultures are (re)produced through the representation of 
insecurities, identities and interests of communities. What is of interest for the 
purposes of this chapter is the differences in the trajectories taken in the (re)
production of security cultures in Turkey and the European Union throughout the 
Cold War and their persistence so far notwithstanding above-mentioned significant 
changes in the European Union, Turkey and the broader security environment.
The chapter falls into three sections. Section one traces the trajectory of the 
evolution of security culture in the European Union during the Cold War. The 
second section looks at the development of security culture in Turkey. Section 
three illustrates these differences with reference to the concrete case of human 
rights in present-day world politics.
The evolution of security culture in the European Union
European integration was a ‘security policy in response to a non-specific and non-
military security problem’, writes Bill McSweeney.12 This may sound paradoxical 
to some, particularly at a time when EU policy-makers are frustrated over the 
slow pace of their progress towards adopting common security and defence 
policies and acquiring an autonomous military force. Yet, the conception of 
security that is at the root of McSweeney’s argument is not one that is ‘reduced 
to its narrowest military dimension’.13 Nor does the author take the nation-state 
as the ultimate referent, or prioritise the military instrument in security provision. 
Rather, this conception recognises the multiple dimensions of security as well 
as non-military instruments of security policy.14 Hence the author’s reading of 
European integration as ‘security policy’.15
Following critical approaches to security, two inter-related arguments 
are offered in this section. First, it is argued that European integration is best 
understood as a process of constructing a ‘security community’ through the 
adoption of broader conceptions and non-military practices of security with 
reference to multiple referents within the European Union and ‘Europe’. Second, 
EU security culture was (re)produced during the Cold War through practices 
aimed at European integration – thus the construction of ‘Europe’ as a subject of 
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security. As such, security culture in the European Union has evolved differently 
from that of non-EU states – including Turkey.
In popular discourse, it is NATO that is referred to as the security institution in 
Western Europe. The European Union is viewed as having taken care of political 
and economic integration. What lies beneath such representations is the high/low 
politics divide that is characteristic of mainstream approaches to security. NATO 
is viewed as having taken care of ‘high politics’ (security achieved through the 
threat and use of military force) whereas ‘low politics’ (political and economic 
integration) was delegated to the European Union.
Although it is true that there evolved, during the Cold War, a division of labour 
between NATO and the EU with the former taking care of ‘external defence’ and 
the latter focusing on European integration, representing NATO as the security 
institution would be misleading – unless, that is, one is fully committed to a 
narrow (military) conception of security. Even then, such an argument will not 
be entirely accurate given the military security concerns that lie at the heart of the 
European Union’s predecessor: the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC). 
The ECSC was founded in 1951 in an attempt to prevent history repeating itself. 
This was endeavoured through strengthening economic and political integration 
with the expectation (in true neo-functionalist fashion) that cooperation over low 
politics issues would spill over into high politics issues. In doing so, economic 
integration made significant progress and spilled over into politics and culture; the 
military dimension lagged behind.
With the end of the Cold War, hopes were raised among EU policy-makers 
for the possibility of an independent foreign and security policy. When such 
expectations did not come true and as the European Union faced difficulties in 
adopting common foreign and security policies, the EU’s Cold War contributions 
to security building in Western Europe became obscured in its internal and 
external representations alike. Increasingly, the European Union was represented 
as a post-Westphalian project that had very little to do with ‘security’.16
This was partly EU policy-makers’ own doing. For, as Ole Wæver has 
maintained, during the 1960s and 1970s, EU policy-makers avoided using the 
language of ‘security’. Instead, they framed problems as ‘normal’ politics so that 
debates over various issues would not be brought to a deadlock because of Cold 
War concerns.17 Most notable among these issues was that of human rights, which 
was central to dialogue with Eastern Europe under Ostpolitik, and was deliberated 
outside the security framework. Indeed, as Bill McSweeney has noted:
it was only with the Single European Act in 1987 that we find explicit 
reference to ‘security’ in the legal instruments binding the member-states in a 
Community, and then only in respect of what was termed its ‘economic and 
security aspects’.18
The policy of avoiding the language of ‘security’ in EU policy discourse 
became so successful that in the 1990s EU policy-makers began to face difficulties 
explaining to the public in the new member states (such as Britain and Denmark) 
Security dimension 71
that ‘security was central to the rationale of European integration because it 
played so little a role at the time of their accession (1972)’.19
To recap, viewed from a mainstream perspective that rests on a high/low 
politics divide, the European Union comes across as part of a division of labour 
agreed with NATO on stability in Western Europe. Yet, from a critical perspective 
that is cognisant of the original rationale for the ECSC, the EU could be presented 
as a ‘non-security response to a specific security problem’.20 As McSweeney has 
argued, ‘the evidence points as plausibly to the need to conceptualise European 
integration as a security policy in response to a non-specific and non-military 
security problem’.21 The problem was non-specific and non-military because 
there was no identifiable threat such as that posed by the Soviet Union to defend 
the members against (as was the case with NATO). Although ‘promoting the 
reconciliation of France and Germany, and of anchoring the one-year-old Federal 
Republic in the Western alliance’22 were prime (and specific) concerns of the time, 
there was another broader (non-specific) concern and it remains to date: binding 
member-states in a network of interdependence so that recourse to military means 
of resolving disputes would become more difficult.23 This was, to adopt karl 
Deutsch’s terminology, an explicit attempt to construct a ‘security community’ in 
Western Europe.24
Deutsch defined a (pluralistic) security community, as ‘one in which there 
is real assurance that the members of that community will not fight each other 
physically, but will settle their disputes in some other way’.25 His conviction was 
that once the conditions and processes that give rise to security communities were 
identified, it would be possible to replicate them in different parts of the world 
so that (preparations for and the idea of) war would not enter into calculations of 
those states.26 To date, European integration remains the best attempt to construct 
a security community.27
From these arguments one can discern the emergence, during the Cold War, of 
an alternative model of security building and a security culture in the European 
Union. This culture is rooted in a broad conception of security that recognises 
military and non-military threats to states and other referent objects (note the 
McSweeney quote in the beginning of this section). Yet, at the same time, this 
culture puts stress on building security without using the language of ‘security’ for 
fear of revoking military responses. In Wæver’s words, ‘the EU has secured the 
security community not by upgrading joint security activities but on the contrary 
by doing other things’.28 Thirdly, and in a related manner, security is sought 
without relying on the military instrument. Indeed, EU security culture has put 
emphasis on soft governance, common security practices and the need for non-
military responses. Hence the 1990s debates on the EU’s self-proclaimed identity 
as a ‘normative power’ that utilises ‘soft power’ (in contrast to US reliance, 
especially during the 2000s, on ‘hard power’).29
During the 1990s, EU policy-makers sought to export their model to the 
candidate countries as well. When the walls came down in 1989, the European 
Union took up the opportunity to move towards further integration whilst seeking 
to expand towards the East. However, whilst transforming itself the European 
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Union produced new insecurities. Writing in 1993, Barry Buzan explained the 
impact of 1989 as follows:
Traditional fears of military revival still lie in the background, and savage 
subregional conflicts already disturb Europe’s complacency. But more 
important than these leftovers from the old security agenda is the exposure, 
and in part creation, of a new form of insecurity … The principal focus of the 
new insecurity is society rather than the state.30
The demands made by the European Union as part of its rather ‘nation-
building’31 project during the early 1990s, when coupled with migration pressures 
from the Eastern and Southern peripheries, resulted in some setbacks on the path 
to further integration (as with the case of the Danish ‘no’ to the EU vote in 1992). 
Such developments, in turn, gave rise to a fear of ‘fragmentation’, that resulted in 
the securitisation of a range of issues, the foremost of which is migration.32
For instance, allowing for a freer movement of EU citizens, which was 
aimed at (re)producing a ‘European’ identity to back up the process of political 
integration, eventually constituted ‘migration’ as a source of insecurity in the 
European Union, for:
as French Interior Minister Philippe Marchand has noted: ‘France’s external 
border is more Germany’s border with Poland and Italy’s with Yugoslavia 
than the German–French or Italian–French borders.’ If the EC is not seen to 
provide adequate defence, then the Community itself could become politically 
vulnerable to nationalist disaffection and charges that it was undermining 
national identities by both encouraging migration and by promoting the 
homogenising forces of Europeanisation.33
Then, by the time the Cold War came to an end, the process of European 
integration had constituted (and was, in turn, constituted by) a security culture 
that prioritised issues of ‘low’ politics and sought to address these issues primarily 
through non-military instruments. During this period, the EU also constituted 
its main insecurity: ‘fragmentation’. ‘Integration’, in turn, was made ‘an aim in 
itself’ and all those issues that threatened the pace of integration were securitised. 
Fragmentation thus came to be viewed as an ‘existential threat’ because the 
prevailing concern was that ‘integration/fragmentation is a question not of how 
Europe will be, but whether Europe will be’.34 As will be seen below, Turkey’s 
policy-makers remained rather oblivious to their EU counterparts’ concerns and 
failed to realise how these became ‘existential threats’ from an EU perspective.
The evolution of security culture in Turkey
By the time the Cold War had come to an end, Turkey’s understandings and 
practices of security had come to shape (and was, in turn, shaped by) a different 
security culture. This had taken place notwithstanding commonalities shared by 
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Turkey and the European Union as members of NATO and ‘the West’. This was 
to do with Turkey’s character as a developing country in that it had to take care of 
specific and non-specific threats of military and non-military kind emanating from 
both inside and outside its national boundaries. Specific threats from outside the 
national boundaries stemmed from perceived Soviet expansionism and external 
aid to Pkk separatism. Specific threats from inside the boundaries included Pkk 
separatists and Islamic reactionaries. Non-specific and non-military threats to 
Turkey’s security took the form of perceived challenges to its sovereign statehood. 
Membership of NATO in particular and ‘the West’ in general addressed most of 
these insecurities (specifically vis-à-vis the Soviet Union and non-specifically in 
respect of sovereign statehood vis-à-vis ‘the West’, see below). Other specific 
insecurities as with the ‘difficult’ neighbourhood (Iran, Iraq and Syria to the south 
and Greece to the west) and the ‘low intensity warfare’ in the southeast, Turkey 
had sought to address on its own.
In meeting all three categories of threats Turkey relied on the strength of its 
military instrument. Turkey’s use of the military instrument took the form of threat 
of force vis-à-vis its neighbours (including the Soviet Union) and use of force 
against Pkk separatists.35 Turkey’s ‘symbolic’ use of the military instrument 
took the form of acting together with ‘the West’ within the NATO framework 
and contributing a significant part of its manpower. Such symbolic use of NATO 
membership helped to reaffirm Turkey’s ‘Westernness’.36 NATO membership in 
particular and Turkey’s Western-oriented policies in general helped to address 
specific and non-specific, military and non-military threats to its sovereign 
statehood. By the early 1990s, Turkey’s security culture was one that sought to 
address issues of both high and low politics through resort to the symbolic or 
actual use of the military instrument through frequent invocation of the language 
of ‘security’. In what follows, this section clarifies Turkey’s security culture by 
way of tracing its emergence and persistence.
A significant component of Turkey’s security culture has been the Republican 
leaders’ answer to the identity question: ‘Who are we?’ ‘Western’ was the answer 
the founders of the Republic offered. During the inter-war period, they sought to 
write Turkey’s ‘Westernness’ into ‘race’ and ‘language’ – tapping then prevalent 
theories of national identity.37 Later, during the Cold War, the ideological stance 
of anti-communism and NATO membership served as the marker of Turkey’s 
‘Western’ identity.
Contra those who reduce Turkey’s Western-oriented policies to the post-WWII 
Soviet threat or a life-style choice,38 I have elsewhere called for understanding 
the option made for a ‘Western’ identity as a security policy in and of itself.39 
For, from the perspective of early Republican leadership, Western orientation was 
not only a life-style choice or a part of the Republican project of emancipation 
(as significant as these aspects were) but also a crucial aspect of the strategy 
of seeking security in the face of a ‘Europe’ that had, in the past, refused equal 
treatment to the Ottoman Empire by virtue of its apparent ‘deficiencies’ in terms 
of the ‘standards of civilisation’. In the early Republican period, the Western 
74 Pınar Bilgin
orientation helped Turkey to meet the ‘standards of civilisation’ thereby allowing 
Turkey’s founding leaders to claim the right to be treated equally and with respect.
Being part of the West was also a strategy to avoid being on the margins of the 
world political and economic system. Such concerns were rooted in a particular 
memory of the final days of the Ottoman Empire that traumatised Turkey’s elite 
– the memory of Anatolia turned into a backwater of the world economic system 
and pushed to the brink of dismemberment. These concerns were (and still are) a 
driving force behind Turkey’s Western orientation throughout the Republican era.
As such, Turkey’s Western orientation was a response to non-specific non-
military insecurities tied up with late Ottoman and early Republican encounters 
with European/International Society. Turkey’s present-day relations with the 
European Union cannot be understood without paying due attention to early 
Republican leaders’ ambivalence to the ‘West’; for, the ‘West’ for them was a 
source of inspiration and insecurity. The otherwise rich literature on Turkey’s 
policies has emphasised the former but overlooked the latter. Accordingly, it has 
failed to account for the present-day ambivalence in Turkey’s policies toward 
the European Union, which is partly (but not wholly) rooted in Turkey’s past 
insecurities.
The Western orientation that was adopted from the early days of the Republic 
onwards remained in the cultural and political realms but did not translate into 
military cooperation until WWII. Even then, Turkey hesitated to join the War 
until the very last days, and then in an attempt to become a founding member 
of the United Nations. Turkey’s security policies came to run in parallel with 
Western Europe as the Cold War descended. An analysis of textual renderings of 
Turkey’s intellectuals of statecraft point to specific and non-specific insecurities on 
Turkey’s agenda.40 Whereas Soviet expansionism and its support for communist 
subversions constituted specific insecurities, being recognised as belonging to 
‘Western civilisation’ constituted a non-specific concern. There followed Turkey’s 
enthusiastic support for the korean War effort, search for NATO membership and 
interest in acceding to European integration.
Over the years, the roles Turkey played in various European security 
institutions have served as occasions on which Turkish policy-makers articulated 
and defined Turkey’s ‘Western’ identity as well as insecurities and interests. 
Turkey’s place in and recognition by European security institutions were viewed 
as strengthening its commitment to liberalism and democracy as well. In the early 
years of European integration, the Turkish elite sought membership as the next 
stage in Turkey’s development and Westernisation. At the time the 1963 Ankara 
Agreement was signed, the European Community was considered the economic 
wing of NATO. Turkey expected that joining another European institution would 
bolster its efforts at being/becoming Western. Second, the economic dimension of 
membership was (and remains) of enormous significance, leading to the signing 
of a Customs Agreement that went into effect in 1995. Third, supporters of EU 
membership were keen to replicate in Turkey the process of rapid development 
that other candidates and EU members went through when preparing for and after 
joining the Union.
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It was not only membership of European security institutions that helped 
re(inscribe) Turkey’s ‘Western’ identity during this period. Turkey’s identity as 
belonging to ‘the West’ was also written into space.41 Through the production of 
a geopolitical discourse that rested on assumptions of ‘geographical givenness’, 
Turkey was located firmly in the West – as a ‘fact’ of geography.42 Yet Turkey’s 
policy-makers’ discourse not only served to locate Turkey in the West but was 
also utilised to justify a specific approach to security policy-making and reliance 
on the military instrument in addressing Turkey’s insecurities.43 For instance, a 
former Minister of Defence said of Turkey was located ‘in the virtual epicentre 
of a “Bermuda Triangle”’.44 As such he stressed the presumably ‘pre-given’ and 
‘unchanging’ character of the security challenges facing Turkey throughout 
its history. It is by no means the traditionalist elite alone who have based their 
arguments on such geographical assumptions of ‘givenness’. An academic 
observer introduced Turkey as a ‘country surrounded with reality’, thereby 
justifying its policies as a struggle for ‘survival‘.45 Such representations of Turkey 
have invariably served to explain Turkey’s supposedly restricted security policy 
options – i.e. dependent on the military instrument.46 In the immediate aftermath 
of the Cold War, they were used to justify persistence in the very same options 
notwithstanding changes in the international security environment. The point 
being, at a time when European policy-makers were seeking to avoid using the 
language of ‘security’ for fear of rendering intra-European problems intractable, 
Turkey’s policy-makers increasingly relied on the language of ‘national security’ 
to by-pass democratic mechanisms and thwart alternative policy options.
In particular, such representations of Turkey’s geographical location have fed 
into an understanding of Turkey’s international relations as a constant struggle 
for security against ‘external’ actors (which often use ‘internal’ actors for their 
purposes). Such an understanding is epitomised in former Prime Minister Bülent 
Ecevit’s remark that ‘considering its geopolitical position, Turkey can never keep 
out of trouble’. Such representations of Turkey’s geography not only serve to 
depoliticise the process of going to war but also write them as inevitable ‘facts’ of 
international relations – facts that can only be prepared for, not prevented. Also 
referred to as the ‘Sèvres syndrome’, this understanding of Turkey’s international 
relations advises the citizens to be always vigilant and on the lookout for 
international (‘Western’) conspiracies to carve out portions of Turkey’s territory.47 
Such conspiracy-oriented thinking, which is difficult to challenge because of 
geopolitical assumptions and language, has prevented many people’s views about 
international relations from evolving even in the face of change.48 Indeed, even 
the process of globalisation is conceived in inside/outside terms and presented 
as a direct threat to Turkey’s ‘national security’ and not as the enmeshment of 
the local and the global, and the blurring of the inside/outside divide that creates 
dangers as well as opportunities for global security.
One problem with such representations of Turkey’s geographical location is 
that they take geography as pre-given and fixed; accordingly, they fail to account 
for different representations of the same geographical location.49 After all, the 
same geographical location has also been represented as follows:
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The new risks and challenges that could affect the whole western world have 
transformed Turkey from a ‘flank’ to a ‘front state’. Turkey is one of the 
few Western countries whose importance has increased in the post-Cold War 
period.50
The point here is that the relationship between geographical location and 
security culture is not one of a fixed geography constituting the pre-givens 
of security policy. Indeed, whereas some in Turkey have tapped so-called 
‘geopolitical truths’ to call for becoming an EU member, others tapped the same 
‘truths’ to caution against EU membership.
Following critical approaches to Political Geography (or Critical Geopoli-
tics)51 the relationship between geographical location and security could be bet-
ter understood as one of mutual constitution. Indeed, what is of interest for the 
purposes of this chapter is what Simon Dalby has called the ‘politics of the geo-
graphical specification of politics’.52 Over the years, representations of Turkey’s 
geographical location have been used by various policy-makers to substantiate 
a range of security policies adopted to meet state-focused insecurities and in-
terests. What was common to all was a deterministic view of the relationship 
between Turkey’s geography and its security policies. The same discourse has 
also been utilised to justify reliance on the military instrument in addressing 
these insecurities.
To summarise, during the Cold War, there evolved a security culture in 
Turkey that sought to address specific military threats (as with perceived Soviet 
expansionism and Pkk separatism aided and abetted by some of Turkey’s 
neighbours) as well as non-specific non-military threats (as with recognition 
by the West as its fully sovereign equal). The referent for security has remained 
the state throughout this period. In addressing these threats, Turkey’s policy-
makers resorted to actual as well as symbolic use of the military instrument and 
the language of ‘security’. Although the military focus has seemingly began to 
dilute with the end of the Cold War with the appearance of so-called low politics 
issues on the NATO security agenda and post-1999 changes in Turkey that have 
resulted in de-emphasis on security language in domestic discourse, as will be 
discussed below, differences between the security cultures of Turkey and its EU 
counterparts remain.
Turkey and the European Union: Different security cultures
The post-Cold War era turned out to be one of turmoil for Turkish policy-makers, 
who to their dismay found out that their EU counterparts were oblivious to if not 
negligent of Turkey’s security concerns. As a result, Turkey’s relations with the 
European Union became increasingly strained during the 1990s. Statements of 
Turkish policy-makers of the time suggest that some were quite resentful of these 
new policies and criticised their EU counterparts for their lack of understanding 
of Turkey’s ‘different’ and ‘unchanging’ security concerns.53 There certainly was 
an element of truth in their arguments. Since threats to the security of the Turkish 
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state did not stem only from the Soviet Union and its allies, East–West détente 
did not mean the same thing for Turkey as it did for, say, Finland or (then West) 
Germany. However, this inertia in security thinking in Turkey during the era of 
détente eventually meant that Turkey was unprepared for the drastic changes 
introduced by Gorbachev’s new thinking that revolutionised security relations 
across Europe.
As the process of deepening and broadening of the European Union constituted 
a security culture that was different from that of non-EU states, this has had two 
major implications for Turkey–EU relations. First, EU policy-makers have come 
to view security issues from within their own security culture – a culture that 
evolved during the Cold War in a relatively stable environment provided by the 
NATO security umbrella. As a result, EU policy-makers grew less understanding 
of the security needs and interests of those countries, such as Turkey, that are still 
faced with military threats stemming from both inside and outside the national 
boundaries. Second, as European integration constituted its own insecurities in 
the form of ‘new’ threats such as migration, Turkey’s accession to European 
integration came to be viewed from the lens of ‘cultural difference’ but not in an 
everyday sense of the term. Rather, this was ‘a difference of security cultures’.
Indeed, highlighting the differences between Turkey and the European Union’s 
security cultures need not render Turkey any less ‘European’. After all ‘the core 
fears of each nation are unique; they relate to its vulnerabilities and historical 
experience. Security thus means different things to different nations’54 and other 
communities. What lies beneath these differences is not only geography or ‘culture’ 
(in the everyday sense of the term) but also diverse paths taken in organising 
political community and seeing/meeting threats to the security of that community. 
The end of the Cold War made only more apparent the different trajectories taken 
by approaches to security in Turkey and the European Union during the Cold War. 
Hence, the argument of this chapter that the ‘difficult’ relationship the European 
Union and Turkey have had since the late 1980s is rooted in their security cultures 
that grew increasingly apart during the Cold War. What is ironic is that Turkish 
policy-makers have always assumed that it was the ‘security relationship’ that 
brought them closer to ‘Europe’.
The clash over the issue of human rights could be viewed as crystallising the 
differences between the security cultures of Turkey and the European Union. 
From an EU perspective, Turkey’s human rights problems is a major concern, not 
only because the EU’s security culture is rooted in a comprehensive approach that 
recognises the individual and societal as well as national dimensions of security. 
Not only that, the EU cares about human rights breaches in its neighbourhood 
also because the EU is apprehensive about its own future. EU politicians, already 
faced with difficulties in distinguishing between political and economic refugees, 
are worried about a further increase in the number of Turkish citizens seeking 
better life chances in the European Union. In other words, this is an ‘existential 
threat’ in the eyes of EU politicians who worry about the EU public’s view of the 
‘Turks’. When one considers the volatility of the project of European integration 
it becomes somewhat easier to understand how Turkey’s policies could be viewed 
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as presenting a societal threat to the European Union. If Turkey is kept out of the 
Union, it could be viewed as constituting an external security threat – a ‘zone 
of conflict’ bordering the EU’s ‘zone of peace’. If it remains as a candidate it 
could be viewed as threat to ‘internal’ security by way of failing to meet the EU’s 
standards – what has made the EU a security community – because Turkey still 
considers as ‘security’ concerns those issues the EU has successfully desecuritised 
over the years.
This gap between the EU and Turkey’s respective security cultures remains 
notwithstanding changes in the external environment (as with the 9/11 attacks) and 
domestic environment (the EU putting somewhat more emphasis on the military 
dimension of security and Turkey somewhat less emphasis). On the one hand, since 
9/11 the European Union has increasingly came to rely on security technologies for 
border management and has been making disquieting trade-offs between liberty 
and security. In doing so EU policies have come to prioritise European integration 
as a security referent, and not necessarily individual European citizens or non-
citizens.55 On the other hand, Turkey has made significant changes in its constitution 
as well as other rules and regulations. The role played by the Military in Turkey’s 
political processes has been de-centralised. In foreign policy, there has been less 
emphasis on the threat and use of force (symbolic and actual) and more on Turkey’s 
ostensibly ‘versatile’ identity ‘between East and West’ and ‘Europe and Asia’. Yet, 
in doing so, Turkey’s security culture has remained focused on the security of the 
state and has not considered other referents. This state-centric focus crystallised in 
Turkey’s reception of Sudan’s President Omar al-Bashir who has visited Turkey 
twice in recent years. Most significantly, these visits took place in the aftermath of 
the International Criminal Court’s (ICC) issuing of an arrest warrant for al-Bashir. 
Turkey not only allowed al-Bashir’s visit but also snubbed EU expressions of 
displeasure with the visit. On paper, Turkey’s policy-makers have a legal escape in 
that Turkey does not yet recognise the ICC. However, in terms of human rights and 
humanitarian values – on which Turkey’s and the EU’s security cultures have come 
to differ – Turkey’s prioritisation of its economic interests over rights and values, 
especially at such a moment of human suffering, speaks volumes about Turkey’s 
present-day stance vis-à-vis security referents other than the state.
Conclusion
Tracing the evolution of respective security cultures of the European Union and 
Turkey as such allows one to be somewhat more accepting of EU politicians’ 
representation of Turkey as producing ‘insecurity’.56 For, in the aftermath of the 
1980 military coup, Turkey began to export some of its domestic problems to 
the European Union via the Turkish diaspora in Western Europe consisting of 
migrant workers and political asylum seekers. EU politicians clearly do not wish 
to see Turkey’s domestic insecurities becoming EU insecurities. Added to this is 
the problem that successive German governments have faced in integrating over 
two million Turkish citizens into German society. For, in a European Union that 
perceives fragmentation as an imminent threat:
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the problems of integrating [the Turks] into German society are projected 
onto the issue of integrating Turkey into the EU: the political, social and 
cultural cohesion of the EU is seen as being endangered by the inclusion of 
almost seventy million Muslim Turks.57
Such juxtaposition of the evolution of two security cultures also allows one 
to be more accepting of Turkey’s policy-makers’ insistence on being/remaining 
a part of ‘Europe’ notwithstanding aforementioned failings regarding human 
rights. In the post-WWII period, a substantive part of Turkey’s claim to belong to 
‘Europe’ rested on the role it played in the Western security architecture.58 Over 
the years, every time Turkey’s valuing of ‘Western security’ came under challenge 
(such as the late 1980s), such criticisms died down following a crisis (as with the 
Iraqi invasion of kuwait in 1990) that enabled Turkey to reinstate its value as a 
‘strategic asset’.59 In other words, during times of crisis, the ‘security relationship’ 
served as Turkey’s anchor in Europe. For Turkey, acceding to European integration 
(and being a part of Western institutions in general) is not merely about life-style 
or economy or ideas and ideals – however important and significant those may 
be. It is also about security – the security of the Republican project, the project of 
modernisation and secularisation.
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